available from secondary data, and valid empirical tests often require that "micro-level data" be collected at the level of the actual decision maker (Calfee and Rubin 1993; Joskow 1991; Williamson 1985) .
In spite of this recent attention, insights from TCA applications still appear to be somewhat underutilized. Two particular problems exist: First, though the extant empirical research has led to important refinements of early versions of the TCA framework (e.g., Coase 1937; Williamson 1975 Williamson , 1985 , many of these refinements are not well known. This is evidenced by a tendency among TCA's critics to focus on its initial versions (e.g. Ghoshal Second, TCA's empirical research is not well integrated. Considered as a whole, the literature has identified a set of distinct antecedent conditions or governance problems, such as safeguarding specific assets. These are TCA's independent variables. Transaction cost analysis's dependent variables are the governance mechanisms, which are used to manage these problems. A variety of mechanisms have been identified in previous research, including pledges (Anderson and Weitz 1992), qualification procedures (Heide and John 1990), monitoring (Stump and Heide 1996), and contracts (Joskow 1987) .
Unfortunately, the TCA literature lacks a thorough review that organizes and summarizes the empirical evidence regarding governance problems and mechanisms. As a result, it is unclear what exactly has been learned by the extant TCA research and what unresolved questions remain. Our purpose is to address this concern by providing such a review. We begin with a brief overview of TCA, its origins, underlying assumptions, and key constructs. By addressing issues of interest to marketing scholars, we then provide a review that synthesizes and integrates the findings of 45 key empirical TCA studies across a broad range of disciplines. We end with a discussion of TCA's unresolved theoretical issues and offer directions for further research.
example, a manufacturer may have difficulty ascertaining whether a distributor is providing customers with necessary presales services. Alternatively, even if the relevant aspects of a distributor's operations can be measured, the information gathering and processing costs incurred by the manufacturer may be substantial.
Opportunism is the assumption that, given the opportunity, decision makers may unscrupulously seek to serve their self-interests, and that it is difficult to know a priori who is trustworthy and who is not (Barney 1990 ). Williamson (1985, p. 47) defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile," and suggests that it includes such behaviors as lying and cheating, as well as more subtle forms of deceit, such as violating agreements. Opportunism poses a problem to the extent that a relationship is supported by specific assets whose values are limited outside of the focal relationship. For example, a manufacturer that invests in training a distributor may subsequently have difficulty replacing the distributor with a new one. The incumbent distributor can exploit the situation opportunistically by demanding various kinds of concessions from the manufacturer. Essentially, the effect of specific assets is to create a safeguarding problem, because market competition no longer serves as a restraint on opportunism. I In addition to the key assumptions and dimensions previously outlined, the complete TCA framework also includes risk neutrality as a third behavioral assumption and transaction frequency as a third transactional dimension. Both of these constructs are specified by Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 but have received limited attention in the TCA literature. Chiles and McMackin (1996) provide a theoretical discussion of the validity of TCA's assumption of risk neutrality, but there are no empirical investigations of this assumption. To date, only a few TCA studies explicitly address transaction frequency.2 According to Williamson (1985, p. 60), higher levels of transaction frequency provide an incentive for firms to employ hierarchical governance, because "the cost of specialized governance structures will be easier to recover for large transactions of a recurring kind." Because of the limited attention that previous research has given to both the assumption of risk neutrality and the dimension of transaction frequency, our review does not address these parts of the TCA framework.
IThe safeguarding problem discussed in TCA closely parallels the discussion of dependence in resource dependence and social exchange theory (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), because specific assets give rise to "replaceability" problems. However, TCA differs from these perspectives because it focuses on governance problems and their solutions simultaneously, rather than on managing dependence ex post. Moreover, TCA explicitly considers the efficiency implications of a firm's governance choices. 2To date, TCA researchers have been largely unsuccessful in confirming the hypothesized effects of frequency, in that several studies have failed to find any positive association between transaction frequency and hierarchical governance (e.g., Anderson 1985; Anderson and Schmittlein 1984; Maltz 1993 Maltz , 1994 . For an exception, see Klein (1989) . Several other researchers consider frequency as a dichotomous phenomena (one-time versus recurring transactions) and thereby control for transaction frequency by examining only recurring exchanges (e.g. John and Weitz 1988; Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990).
The Logic of Transaction Cost Analysis
The basic premise of TCA is that if adaptation, performance evaluation, and safeguarding costs are absent or low, economic actors will favor market governance. If these costs are high enough to exceed the production cost advantages of the market, firms will favor internal organization. The logic behind this argument is based on certain a priori assumptions about the properties of internal organization and its ability to minimize transaction costs. Three specific aspects of organizations are relevant in this respect. First, organizations have more powerful control and monitoring mechanisms available than do markets because of their ability to measure and reward behavior as well as output (Eisenhardt 1985; Oliver and Anderson 1987) . As a result, the firm's ability to detect opportunism and facilitate adaptation is enhanced. Second, organizations are able to provide rewards that are long term in nature, such as promotion opportunities. The effect of such rewards is to reduce the payoff from opportunistic behavior. Third, Williamson (1975) acknowledges the possible effects of the organizational atmosphere, in which organizational culture and socialization processes may create convergent goals between parties and reduce opportunism ex ante.
Although TCA's original framework poses the governance question as a discrete choice between market exchange and internal organization, the current version of the theory explicitly acknowledges that features of internal organization can be achieved without ownership or complete vertical integration. A variety of hybrid mechanisms have been identified in the literature, ranging from formal mechanisms, such as contractual provisions and equity arrangements (Joskow 1987 (1984, 1987 ) also provide studies of component sourcing among U.S. automobile manufacturers. This makeor-buy issue for production inputs has also been examined by Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) , Levy (1985) , Lieberman (1991), Masten (1984) , and Masten, Meehan, and Snyder (1991). Maltz extends the make-or-buy approach by using TCA to examine the conditions under which a manufacturer would select in-house versus outsourced shipping (Maltz 1993 ) and warehousing functions (Maltz 1994) .
In terms of forward vertical integration, TCA studies focus on the integration by manufacturers into distribution in both domestic and international contexts. For example, John and Weitz (1988) use TCA to examine forward integration into distribution and explore manufacturers' use of direct (i.e., through employees) versus indirect (i.e., through commission agents) channels of distribution. In a 4Although we provide the most comprehensive review of the TCA framework as applied in a marketing context, several other reviews are available in the literature (e.g., Anderson 1996 In addition to these secondary publications, another rich source of secondary data frequently employed by economists and legal scholars comes from contractual agreements between exchange partners. For example, Leffler and Rucker (1991) collect information from 188 timber harvesting contracts through interviews with key informants in the timber industry. Palay (1984) employs a similar method in his study of contractual transactions between rail freight carriers and shippers. In contrast to these two studies, Joskow (1987) uses a database of actual contracts between coal suppliers and electrical utilities. To facilitate this type of research, a depository of interorganizational contracts, the 5Some interesting recent work has also begun to explore the antecedents of TCA's other variables, such as asset specificity (e.g.,
Bensaou and Anderson 1997).
Center for Contracts and the Structure of Enterprise at the University of Pittsburgh, has been established and is available for public use. Along with secondary publications, these contractual records provide an excellent means of gathering data for historical TCA-related research.
The most recent data collection innovation in TCA research is the use of experimental methodology. For example, Pilling, Crosby, and Jackson (1994) employ a 2 x 2 x 2 between-groups factorial design in which they manipulate two levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency by using a role-playing scenario. They then assess the impact of these manipulated factors on perceived transaction costs among a group of 229 purchasing managers. In a related experimental investigation, Dutta and John (1995) use student subjects to assess the degree to which technology licensing by suppliers acts as a safeguard for buyers' specific investments by restraining their trading partner's opportunistic behavior (i.e., price hikes). In addition to their experimental investigation, Dutta and John also collect secondary data on actual firm behavior. This type of multimethod approach is promising for future TCA investigations.
Measurement. Because of its contextual and methodological diversity, the empirical TCA literature presents a host of measurement-related issues for potential analysis. We focus our discussion on issues related to the operationalization of TCA constructs. These issues are especially important for future TCA investigators, because many of the studies in our review have faced measurement-related difficulties. Specifically, our discussion addresses the operationalization of TCA's key dependent (i.e., governance structure) and independent (asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty) constructs.
I 2. Asset specificity. Asset specificity refers to the transferability of the assets that support a given transaction (Williamson 1985) . Assets with a high amount of specificity represent sunk costs that have little value outside of a particular exchange relationship. Williamson (199 lb) has identified six main types of asset specificity: (1) site specificity, (2) physical asset specificity, (3) human asset specificity, (4) brand name capital, (5) dedicated assets, and (6) temporal specificity. We focus on human specific assets, because they represent the type of asset specificity most commonly assessed in both the empirical studies included in our review and TCA applications in general (Lohita, Brooks, and Krapfel 1994). There are at least two reasons behind its popularity: First, many TCA studies involve contexts in which human investments represent a substantial and important cost of doing business (e.g., sales, purchasing). Second, human specific assets lend themselves to a wide variety of measurement approaches, both directly through secondary data sources, such as sales reports, and indirectly through survey instruments.
Transaction Cost Analysis / 41
Transaction cost analysis researchers typically treat human asset specificity as a latent construct and assess it using multi-item scales. The most commonly used measure of human asset specificity is Anderson's (1985 Although human asset specificity is typically measured through some form of survey instrument, many studies assess this construct through secondary data indicants. For example, Monteverde and Teece (1982a) assess human asset specificity by obtaining engineering cost ratings for automobile components. Studies by Masten and colleagues follow a similar approach (i.e., Masten 1984; Masten, Meehan, and Snyder 1989, 1991). Indicants such as these provide only an approximate specification of the construct, which leads to potential construct validity problems. However, given the constraints of secondary data, more direct measures may not be available. In such situations, multimethod approaches may be needed to establish construct validity prior to testing substantive hypotheses.
3. Environmental uncertainty. As is theorized in the TCA literature, environmental uncertainty refers to "unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange" (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990, p. 82). Among all the TCA constructs, environmental uncertainty seems to be the most problematic from a measurement standpoint. Specifically, there appear to be two competing operationalizations of this construct. The most commonly held perspective emphasizes the unpredictable nature of the external environment, whereas the second view examines both unpredictability and complexity.
The most popular operationalization of environmental uncertainty focuses on the unpredictability of the environment. For example, Anderson (1985 , uses a nine-item scale that addresses elements related to both the instability associated with environmental turbulence (e.g., complexity, volatility) and the dangers of venturing into new activities (e.g., new markets, new sales). Heide and John (1990) ). These scholars operationalize environmental uncertainty as a two-dimensional concept that entails elements of both unpredictability and changeability. Moreover, they suggest that these two types of uncertainty have opposing influences on governance structures. Specifically, they posit that whereas unpredictability encourages firms to form hierarchical mechanisms, changeability has just the opposite effect. For example, Klein (1989) distinguishes between dynamism and complexity as elements of environmental uncertainty. He defines uncertainty-dynamism as "the rate at which changes in the environment occur," and uncertaintycomplexity as "the degree to which the respondent perceived the environment as simple or complex" (p. 257).
Having reviewed both of these two alternative conceptualizations of environmental uncertainty, the obvious question is, Which provides the appropriate conceptual domain for further TCA investigations? Ultimately, the answer must be made on theoretical grounds. If a researcher has reason to expect that key elements of the external environment could possibly act as a disincentive for hierarchical modes of governance, a multidimensional operationalization such as Klein's (1989) may be in order. In the absence of such a theoretical supposition, the traditional unpredictability operationalization may be sufficient. Another important point of consideration is the study context. For example, though the traditional unpredictability view of environmental uncertainty has commonly been employed in a domestic channel-relations context (e.g., Anderson 1985; Heide and John 1990), in which complexity is likely to be manageable, the context for Klein's (1989) and Klein, Frazier, and Roth's (1990) studies concerns foreign market entry decisions, in which complexity is likely to be a much greater concern.
In addition to these multiple-item measures, a few studies also have assessed the environmental uncertainty construct through single-item measures (e.g., Anderson 5. General measurement-related concerns. Having completed this summary of the conceptualization and measurement of each element of the TCA framework, we now emphasize a few key points and express some general measurement-related concerns. First, as can be seen from the prior discussion, there appears to be a reasonable degree of consistency in the conceptualization and measurement of the TCA framework. Specifically, several studies build on the early work of Anderson (1985 
How Valid is Transaction Cost Analysis's Conceptual Framework?
We provide an assessment of the validity of the TCA framework by synthesizing the key findings of the studies we review in terms of governance problems, their antecedent conditions, and the governance mechanisms used to manage them.
Safeguarding problem. A safeguarding problem arises when a firm deploys specific assets and fears that its partner may opportunistically exploit these investments. Thus, the antecedents of the safeguarding problem are opportunism and asset specificity. Among the studies in our review, safeguarding is the most commonly examined governance problem. These studies provide considerable support for TCA's hypothesized effects of specific assets and mixed support for its assumption about the existence of opportunistic actors.
Support for the role of opportunism comes from a recent lab study by Dutta and John (1995) . This study reveals that a supplier that controls a market with a monopoly position is more likely to engage in price hikes than a supplier that shares the market with another supplier. Thus, this study lends support to Williamson's (1985) proposition that small-numbers bargaining leads to opportunistic exploitation. Additional support for opportunism comes from , who finds that a direct sales force displays less opportunistic behavior than do manufacturers' representatives.
Somewhat contradictory evidence regarding the role of opportunism is also available among the studies in our review. In his examination of opportunistic behavior in interfirm relationships, John (1984, p. 287) reaches the following conclusion:
It appears that opportunism can be viewed usefully as an endogenous variable that is evoked by certain antecedents within a long-run relationship. In other words, individuals may not always behave opportunistically even if conditions permit such behavior. Refusals to honor agreements and misrepresentation of intentions cannot be taken for granted. Rather, they are induced by certain other factors.
In accordance with John's (1984) contention, Palay (1984) finds that idiosyncratic investments in rail freight relationships often lead to the development of trust between exchange parties. Finally, in his study of strategic alliances, Parkhe (1993) finds that opportunistic behavior among alliance partners is commonly attenuated by a history of prior cooperation.
Although the literature is mixed regarding the extent of opportunism in exchange relationships, it appears that when opportunism is present, it has a negative impact on performance. For example, Parkhe (1993) finds that opportunistic activities by a strategic alliance partner diminishes alliance performance. Indirect evidence of the performance-diminishing effects of opportunism comes from Pilling, Crosby, and Jackson (1994), who show that high levels of opportunism weaken the relational focus between buyers and suppliers.
Transaction cost analysis proposes that, because of the opportunistic behavior of trading partners, high levels of asset specificity increase the costs of safeguarding contractual agreements. The few studies in our review that try to measure actual or perceived transaction costs provide support for this proposition. For example, in their experimental study, Pilling, Crosby, and Jackson (1994) find that asset specificity has a significant positive impact on both ex ante and ex post transaction costs. Likewise, Walker and Poppo (1991) find that specific assets devoted to profit center transactions within a firm lead to lower transaction costs compared to specific assets invested in external suppliers.
When faced with the need to safeguard specific assets invested in an exchange relationship, early TCA work claimed that a firm generally seeks to minimize its transaction costs through vertical integration (Williamson 1985). This claim is broadly supported by the articles in our review. For example, several studies of the make-or-buy decision for production components find that parts requiring high levels of specific investments are more likely to be internally produced than externally sourced (Masten 1984; Masten, Meehan, and Snyder 1989, 1991; Monteverde and Teece 1982). Likewise, Lieberman (1991) finds that the threat of lock-in due to specific investments is positively related to backward integration by chemical manufacturers. High levels of investment in specific assets also are related positively to a firm's probability of integrating both its warehousing and shipping functions (Maltz 1993 (Maltz , 1994 .
Other evidence for the use of vertical integration as a safeguard for specific assets comes from several studies of foreign market entry, which find that asset specificity is related positively to the use of higher levels of control in foreign markets ( Levy (1985) and Walker and Poppo( 1991). (e.g., Williamson 1991b, 1996) suggests that firms can safeguard their specific assets through a wide range of hybrid governance mechanisms, such as pledges and bilateral contracting. These hybrid governance modes fall into two general categories. One maintains a discrete separation between the exchange parties and enforces agreements through contractual authority. The other fosters closer ties between exchange partners and enforces agreements through appeals to common interests. Following Heide's (1994) recent typology of governance structures, we respectively refer to these two types of hybrid mechanisms as unilateral and bilateral. Both types of governance structures are alternatives to market transactions and vertical integration for presenting viable safeguarding mechanisms.
As was noted previously, recent work in TCA theory
Unilateral hybrid governance mechanisms provide a way to safeguard specific assets by solidifying ex ante agreements with an exchange partner. For example, faced with a high degree of site specificity, coal suppliers that are "minemouthed" next to an electrical utility plant safeguard their specific assets by entering long-term contractual arrangements (Joskow 1987 In contrast to the unilateral mechanisms, bilateral hybrid governance structures appear to provide a firm with a way to safeguard its specific assets by developing closer ties with its exchange partners. For example, Heide and John (1990) find that suppliers that have specific assets invested in a manufacturer establish close ties with that manufacturer by means of joint action and expectations of continuity. In a related study, Heide and John (1992) show that relational norms (i.e., flexibility, information exchange, and solidarity) are present in buyer-supplier relationships and enable buyers to protect their specific investments by gaining control over supplier decision making, thus reducing the hazards of opportunism. Support for the development of relational norms also can be found in Anderson and Weitz's (1992) and Palay's (1984) studies.
In summary, though TCA's assumption of opportunism receives mixed support from the studies in our review, the use of governance in general and vertical integration in particular as a means of safeguarding specific assets is broadly confirmed. Empirical applications of TCA clearly show that many firms attempt to safeguard their specific assets from possible opportunistic behavior through vertical integration. However, these studies also demonstrate that in addition to vertical integration, firms can protect their specific assets by pursuing a variety of unilateral and bilateral hybrid governance mechanisms, such as quasi integration, selection procedures, and the development of relational norms. Adaptation problem. An adaptation problem is created when a firm whose decision makers are limited by bounded rationality has difficulty modifying contractual agreements to changes in the external environment. Thus, the antecedents of the adaptation problem are bounded rationality and environmental uncertainty. Because none of the studies in our review explicitly assesses bounded rationality, we focus our discussion on environmental uncertainty. Overall, these studies present mixed support for TCA's hypothesized effects of environmental uncertainty.
According to TCA, high levels of environmental uncertainty increase the costs of adapting contractual agreements. Only one study in our review explicitly assesses the impact of environmental uncertainty on transaction costs (Pilling, Crosby, and Jackson 1994). In this study, Pilling, Crosby, and Jackson find that environmental uncertainty has a significant positive effect on the ex ante costs of developing an exchange relationship but has no effect on the ex post costs of activity monitoring. Klein and Roth (1993) provide indirect support for the impact of environmental uncertainty on transaction costs by finding that firms facing lower levels of environmental uncertainty exhibit higher levels of satisfaction with their channel partners than firms facing higher levels of environmental uncertainty. Williamson (1985) posits that, when faced with the need to adapt to an uncertain environment, a firm will seek to minimize its transaction costs through vertical integration. This proposition garners only partial support from the TCA studies included in our review. Specifically, though some researchers find TCA's anticipated effects of environmental uncertainty, others find no effects of environmental uncertainty, and still others find that some types of environmental uncertainty actually act as a disincentive to vertical integration.
Compared to asset specificity, the studies in our review provide limited support for TCA's hypothesized effects of environmental uncertainty. Only a few of the studies that measure environmental uncertainty find it positively related to either vertical integration or hybrid forms of governance. For example, Levy (1985) finds that manufacturing firms with high levels of environmental uncertainty exhibit higher levels of vertical integration compared to firms with lower levels of uncertainty. Similarly, John and Weitz (1988) show that environmental uncertainty is related positively to forward vertical integration among manufacturers of industrial products. Masten (1984) finds that, when faced with high levels of environmental uncertainty, manufacturers are more likely to produce an assembly component internally than to purchase it from an external supplier.
In contrast to the studies described previously, many other TCA applications are considerably less sanguine in their support for TCA's hypothesized effects of environmental uncertainty. For example, Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and Maltz (1994) find that environmental uncertainty has no significant impact on vertical integration. Other studies suggest that environmental uncertainty has a positive impact on vertical integration, but only through its interaction with other transaction-related factors, such as asset specificity (Anderson 1985) (1996) show that technological uncertainty decreases a supplier's willingness to invest in buyer-specific assets.
In addition to the fear of technological obsolescence, the dangers associated with operating in unfamiliar or quickly changing environments also appear to act as disincentives against vertical integration. For example, Klein (1989) shows that high levels of environmental complexity encourage exporters to exert higher levels of vertical control in foreign markets, whereas environmental dynamism (i.e., the rate of change) encourages exporters to exert lower levels of control. Likewise, Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) In summary, the role of governance as a means of adapting to uncertain environments receives mixed support from the studies in our review. Although a few TCA researchers find that environmental uncertainty is positively associated with vertical integration, a greater number of researchers show that, in some contexts, environmental uncertainty either has no impact on vertical integration or acts as a disincentive against integration. Environmental uncertainty is a multidimensional construct, and firms are hesitant to adopt a hierarchical governance structure when this uncertainty entails risks of either unfamiliar operating environments or technological obsolescence.
Performance evaluation problem. A performance evaluation problem arises when a firm whose decision makers are limited by bounded rationality has difficulty assessing the contractual compliance of its exchange partners. Thus, the antecedents of the performance evaluation problem are bounded rationality and behavioral uncertainty. Because none of the studies in our review explicitly assesses bounded rationality, we focus our discussion on behavioral uncertainty. Although performance evaluation is the least commonly investigated governance problem, several studies in Transaction Cost Analysis / 45 our review provide considerable support for TCA's hypothesized effects of behavioral uncertainty.
Transaction cost analysis claims that high levels of behavioral uncertainty increase the costs of evaluating the performance of exchange partners. Unfortunately, none of the studies in our review formally tests the relationship between behavioral uncertainty and transaction costs. Assuming that such a relationship exists, Williamson (1985) claims that firms try to minimize the costs of evaluating the performance of their exchange partners through the mechanism of vertical integration. This assertion receives strong support from the empirical TCA studies in our review.
A series of studies by Anderson and colleagues show that behavioral uncertainty is positively related to a manufacturer's decision to employ a direct sales force rather than manufacturers' representatives ( In addition to fostering higher levels of vertical integration, firms attempt to reduce the performance evaluation costs associated with behavioral uncertainty through the use of hybrid governance mechanisms. For example, Heide and John (1990) show that behavioral uncertainty faced by manufacturers is positively related to the degree to which they seek supplier qualification through such activities as evaluating the supplier's engineering and manufacturing capabilities.
In summary, though none of the studies in our review tests either the assumption of bounded rationality or the relationship between behavioral uncertainty and transaction costs, TCA's claim that firms employ vertical integration as a means of easing the burden of performance evaluation is broadly supported. Empirical applications of TCA clearly show that firms attempt to manage the performance evaluation problem through both vertical integration and hybrid governance structures.
Theoretical Questions and Further Research
As can be seen from the preceding review, TCA research is faced with several unanswered questions. In this section, we consider these questions in conjunction with some recent critiques of TCA to identify key issues for further research.
In particular, we focus on (1) the concept of transaction costs, (2) TCA's behavioral assumptions, (3) the effects of environmental uncertainty, (4) TCA's unit of analysis, and (5) the governance decision.
The Concept of Transaction Costs
As several TCA critics have noted, the concept of transaction costs was not articulated clearly in Williamson's (1975 Williamson's ( , 1985 original framework (see Dow 1987; Kay 1992). Currently, however, the nature of these costs is much better understood. In Table 2 , we summarize the source and nature of the most common forms of transaction costs. As is shown in this table, transaction costs may arise in the form of direct or opportunity costs (Malone 1987; Masten, Meehan, and Snyder 1991). These costs are directly related to asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty. As was noted previously, asset specificity creates a safeguarding problem (Rubin 1990). Without appropriate safeguards, firms face the risks of expropriation (ex post) or pro- Environmental uncertainty creates an adaptation problem. The associated transaction costs include the direct costs of communicating new information, renegotiating agreements, or coordinating activities to reflect new circumstances. A failure to adapt involves an opportunity cost of maladaptation (Malone 1987) . For example, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) may need to incur considerable transaction costs in order to motivate an external supplier to modify the design of the components that constitute its end product (Walker and Weber 1984). A failure to undertake such changes, however, may place the OEM at a competitive disadvantage relative to other manufacturers.
Behavioral uncertainty gives rise to a performance evaluation problem. To the extent that a party's true level of performance is not readily apparent, direct measurement costs may need to be incurred. These may be in the form of measuring outputs or behaviors (Eisenhardt 1985) . In the original TCA framework, because of the need to prevent opportunistic exploitation, evaluation problems give rise to measurement costs. Ouchi (1979) provides a different account of this process. According to Ouchi, measurement costs are incurred in order to distribute rewards across parties in an equitable fashion. If rewards are not allocated equitably, a party may eventually reduce its individual efforts. Thus, a performance measurement failure may lead to opportunity costs in the form of productivity losses. For example, a failure on the part of a manufacturer to monitor and control free riding across sales territories could cause distributors to reduce their sales efforts for the manufacturer's brands, which ultimately could place the firm at a competitive disadvantage.
Behavioral uncertainty causes difficulty because of ex post information asymmetry regarding task performance. Information asymmetry also may exist ex ante, because of an inability to ascertain a party's true characteristics prior to exchange. Typically referred to as adverse selection (Akerlof 1970 ), this problem is more commonly associated with agency theory than with TCA per se. For our purposes, however, we note that this form of information asymmetry gives rise to direct transaction costs in the form of selection and screening efforts designed to identify appropriate exchange partners a priori (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992). The relevant opportunity costs are associated with losses resulting from establishing relationships with parties that lack needed skills or motivation.
The preceding discussion highlights some important aspects of transaction costs. First, such costs may be incurred both ex ante, in connection with selection or information gathering, and ex post, in connection with measurement and enforcement. Second, the relevant opportunity costs, though not as well understood as the direct costs, may be important determinants of firm performance. The potential inability to use specialized assets and adapt to changing circumstances or more generally to the foregone profits from "valuable deals that won't be done" (Calfee and Rubin 1993, p. 164) suggests that a firm's governance decision not only influences costs in a narrow sense, but also is an important determinant of value. This point has not always been recognized in previous research (Zajac and Olsen 1993).
One frequently expressed concern is that despite TCA's explicit normative orientation, there is limited empirical evidence of the performance effects of following TCA's guidelines. Most of the studies in our review are limited to documenting whether firms follow TCA prescriptions rather than to examining how firm decisions affect performance. Transition cost analysis researchers have justified this descriptive-oriented approach by intentionally studying competitive industries, in which the survivors are assumed to follow normative decision rules (Shelanski and Klein 1995).6
The limited research on TCA's performance implications makes it difficult to assess fully its theoretical value and empirical validity. As can be seen in our review, a small but growing number of researchers (e.g., Heide and John 1988; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990; Pilling, Crosby, and Jackson 1994; Sriram, Krapfel, and Spekman 1992; Walker and Poppo 1991) have attempted to measure transaction costs or performance dimensions. We encourage future researchers to further these efforts by developing reliable and valid measures of transaction costs and examining the performance implications of aligning governance problems and structures.
Two related areas of further research also deserve substantial attention. First, though TCA recognizes that governance decisions involve a trade-off between transaction and production costs, few studies have examined the role of production costs. In addition, there is a considerable degree of divergence among the studies that do include production costs, as some researchers find that production costs have a greater impact on governance structures than transaction costs (e.g., Klein Opportunism. Compared to bounded rationality, TCA's assumption of opportunism is considerably more controversial (Donaldson 1990; Ghoshal and Moran 1996) . Much of the controversy has focused on whether TCA's notion of opportunism is descriptively accurate, or whether terms such as trust more closely describe how exchange partners behave. In our opinion, this particular critique of TCA is somewhat misplaced.7 As was noted previously, TCA does not assume that all social actors are opportunistically inclined, only that some actors behave opportunistically, and it is difficult and costly to identify opportunistic actors ex ante (Barney 1990) . Furthermore, the current TCA literature explicitly acknowledges that opportunism is an endogenous variable, rather than an invariable and fixed condition John 1984) .
On the basis of recent research, we believe that there are other questions surrounding opportunism that warrant greater attention. These questions pertain to (1) the proper labeling of relationship behaviors, (2) the antecedents of these behaviors, and (3) the implications of deviations from opportunism. In regard to the first, Chiles and McMackin (1996) Ultimately, the most important question surrounds the implications of deviations from opportunism. Recall that the basic premise of TCA is that the risk of opportunism creates a need for formalized governance structures. Several researchers have argued on conceptual grounds that trust, due to either social norms or personal relations, may serve as a substitute for formal mechanisms such as contracts and direct controls (e.g., Griesinger 1990; Hill 1990; Macaulay 1963). The empirical evidence on this issue is both limited and mixed. In support of the substitution hypothesis, Gulati (1995) finds that previous alliances between a set of parties reduce the need for explicit (i.e., equity-based) governance in subsequent alliances. Likewise, Stump and Heide (1996) show that early supplier qualification efforts tend to reduce buyers' subsequent monitoring efforts. A different pattern of results emerges from Heide and John's (1992) study of buyer-supplier relationships. They find that the presence of relationship-specific norms enhances a buyer's ability to acquire control over a supplier. By themselves, however, norms have no effect on buyer control. Thus, norms serve as moderators of control, rather than have a direct impact on it. An important avenue for further research is to determine the specific consequences of competing behavioral assumptions.
The Effects of Environmental Uncertainty
The impact of environmental uncertainty on governance decisions is ambiguous. According to the original TCA framework, the effect of external uncertainty is an inability to write an a priori comprehensive contract (Williamson 1985). In turn, an adaptation problem is created, which involves potential transaction costs in connection with modifying relationships to changing circumstances. The original prediction, however, is that adaptation is only problematic in the presence of specific assets (Williamson 1975 Roth (1990) , is that what appears in the extant studies as main effects may actually be interactions. For example, Noordewier, John, and Nevin do not explicitly measure asset specificity in their study, but assume that asset specificity exists at a nonzero level. Thus, their test of uncertainty, though not a formal test of an interaction with asset specificity, may be consistent with TCA's notion of the joint effects of these variables. Another possibility is that because interactions and main effects often are highly correlated, the inclusion of both types of effects leads to an increase in standard errors, which makes both effects nonsignificant. For example, Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) examine the effects of asset specificity and environmental uncertainty, but find no significant effects for either the interaction term or the main effects of uncertainty due to collinearity.
Although we believe that the latter line of reasoning is plausible, it is also possible that the reported main effects of environmental uncertainty have a conceptual explanation. These main effects suggest that the problem created by environmental uncertainty is handled more efficiently by creating a governance structure that permits adaptation within an ongoing relationship, rather than by switching to a new partner if changes need to be made. In other words, internal organization and other forms of planned governance (Williamson 1991b) are inherently superior to market or spontaneous governance with respect to processing and responding to new information. In the case of complete integration, this is due to the presence of an authority structure that can bring about adaptation through fiat (Williamson 1985) Gulati (1995) shows how the governance features of earlier joint ventures between firms (i.e., the financial arrangements used) influence the governance of subsequent ventures. Gulati's general conclusion is that prior learning or experience with a particular exchange partner may reduce the need for more formal governance mechanisms in subsequent transactions.
In addition to the impact of past relationships, anticipation about future exchanges may influence how a present exchange is organized. Drawing on Axelrod's (1984) work on repeated games, Heide and Miner (1992) show that the "shadow of the future" represented by a relationship's expected time horizon, promotes cooperation in the present. Likewise, Parkhe (1993) finds that partners that commit specific investments (i.e., pledges) to a strategic alliance lengthen the shadow of the future, which leads to increased alliance performance by reducing the need for costly contractual safeguards. In game theory terminology, expectations of future exchanges serve as enforcement devices because of the ability to reward or punish prior "moves." As Parkhe (1993) notes, important conceptual linkages between TCA and game theory could provide insights into both perspectives.
The previous examples show that the time dimension within a given relationship has implications for how an individual transaction is governed because of either the past history of interorganizational relations or the incentive structure created by the expectation of future transactions. In addition, the governance of a particular transaction may be influenced by other actors within an interorganizational network, either directly or indirectly (Anderson, Hakansson, and Johanson 1994; Hakansson and Snehota 1995). However, the specific processes that may occur within an interorganizational network have not always been clearly described. DiMaggio and Powell's (1983) theory of institutional isomorphism provides some insight into this issue. The main premise of this theory is that organizational decision making may be influenced as much by imitation as it is by efficiency. Unlike TCA, which attempts to explain governance choice on the basis of certain dimensions of a relationship, institutional isomorphism theory claims that the structure of a given relationship is a question not only of efficient adaptation at the dyadic level, but also of imitation throughout a network. For example, recent work on population-level learning by Miner and Haunschild (1995, p. 155) suggests that in contrast to TCA's emphasis on fixed transaction dimensions in determining particular organizational forms, "the population learning perspective would emphasize instead ways in which firms may have copied such practices from each other, often believing them to be technically useful." Expanding the unit of analysis is helpful in identifying a broader range of governance options than what was considered in the original TCA framework. We hope that further research will document these governance options in greater detail.
The Governance Decision
Our review of empirical TCA research highlights some of the alternative governance mechanisms used in managing interorganizational relationships. Some researchers have labeled these alternative governance mechanisms "hybrids" and suggest that they can be viewed conceptually as midpoints on a continuum ranging from market exchange to hierarchical integration (e.g., Williamson 199 lb).
Several other researchers have argued that this hybrid perspective is too simplistic and that the market-hierarchy continuum obscures the different ways in which relationships can be organized (e.g., Bradach and Eccles 1989). Echoing these thoughts, both Heide (1994) and Robicheaux and Coleman (1994) suggest that there is a broad range of nonmarket relationships that differ in important and systematic ways. For example, some of the studies in our review claim that governance problems can be managed by early selection and/or socialization efforts (e.g., Heide and John 1990 ). Other studies focus on the role of incentives (e.g., Anderson and Weitz 1992) and the development of relational norms (e.g., Heide and John 1992) in governing relationships.
Although many different governance classification schemes can be developed, the diversity of governance mechanisms identified in previous research raises important theoretical and practical questions. First, the relative effectiveness of different governance mechanisms in addressing particular governance problems has not been explored fully. For example, is partner selection preferable to incentive design for the purpose of minimizing the risk of subsequent holdup? Would a manufacturer be better off investing in a comprehensive supplier selection process (Stump and Heide 1996), rather than relying on contractual penalties (Masten and Crocker 1985) ?
Second, previous research has identified a range of distinct governance problems but has not fully answered how the available governance mechanisms align with these problems. For example, though partner selection is most commonly associated with information asymmetry problems (e.g., Ouchi 1979), it also may minimize the risk of holdup (Stump and Heide 1996) as well as facilitate adaptation to uncertainty. Thus, any individual governance mechanism may serve multiple purposes.
Third, on a related note, the specific effects of different governance mechanisms have not been well documented by previous research. As an example, hard contractual provisions (Joskow 1987 ) and explicit control (Celly and Frazier 1996) may serve as effective checks on opportunism. It is unclear, however, what other effects such mechanisms have. Conceivably, such strategies may produce compliance without inducing true cooperation (Bonoma 1976 ). Thus, though a large body of empirical evidence has been generated on the use of various governance mechanisms, a discriminating theory of governance choice is still at an early stage of development.
Fourth and finally, TCA's aforementioned emphasis on individual transactions as the unit of analysis ignores how different governance forms can be combined. Transaction cost analysis implicitly frames a firm's governance decision as a choice between competing alternatives-in its simplest form a discrete choice between market, hierarchy, or some intermediate or hybrid form (Williamson 1991b). In all of this literature, however, the focus is on a single governance form. Bradach and Eccles (1989) challenge this view and persuasively argue that firms may purposely combine different governance forms by using a "plural forms" approach. Although Bradach and Eccles (1989) limit themselves to presenting the general argument, subsequent research has begun to identify the specific antecedents of such a strategy. Bergen and colleagues (1995) provide the first TCA study of plural forms; they use an industrial distribution context, in which manufacturers often face the options of either serving a particular sales territory entirely with independent agents (i.e., market governance) or relying on a combination of agents and direct sales to house accounts (i.e., market and hierarchical governance). They suggest that a plural forms approach permits manufacturers to achieve the benefits typically associated with market governance (e.g., scale economies, high-powered incentives) while minimizing its inherent shortcomings (e.g., risk of opportunistic exploitation). Specifically, augmenting an agent system with a direct sales force permits a manufacturer to manage the safeguarding and performance evaluation problems that might be associated with a (unitary) agent system. As such, a plural forms approach may offer governance synergies of various kinds. This is an especially important area for future applications of TCA.
Conclusion
Like all useful theories, TCA has steadily evolved over time in response to new theoretical and empirical developments. For example, though a workable theory of transaction costs had been formulated by the early 1970s, its transaction dimensions were not formally specified until around 1980 (Joskow 1988) . Although the marketing discipline has recently seen an explosion of TCA research efforts, and transaction costs are quickly becoming an established research paradigm, the basic theory is still in need of further development (Rangan, Corey, and Cespedes 1993). As Williamson (1992, p. 349) states, "Transaction cost economics needs to be refined and extended. It needs to be qualified and focused. It needs to be tested empirically."
The first step in refining any theory is to conduct a thorough assessment of its current status and a synthesis of its key findings. By providing a comprehensive and integrative review of 45 key empirical examinations of the TCA framework, along with an agenda for future research efforts, we lay the conceptual groundwork for the further refinement and extension of TCA investigations both within marketing and in related disciplines. We hope this effort provides TCA researchers with a useful review of previous TCA research, a synthesis of our current knowledge, and a set of fresh insights for further investigations of this intriguing theory.
